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Knowledge Specificity 
in Management Control System Design 
A Case Study Evidence 
V G Sridharan '" 
This paper builds a theoretic model to explain why and how knowledge specificity 
impacts firms' Management Conuo( Systems (MCS), based on Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). The model concludes that managers organize MCS on an 
individualized basis when know/edge specificity in a transaction is fow, and involve 
worker teams when the specificity is high. Using the Product Variety Strategy (PV5) 
as a proxy for knowledge specificity, the model is examined in four New Zealand 
case units. The evidence is largely consistent with the theory, where fOf low specificit.y, 
decision management righrs are cenrralized but the execution righe ;5 delegated to 
individual workers. The performance of individual workers is evaluaced through task 
standards, and the incentive compensation is partly traced to individual performance. 
For high specificity, decision management rights are shared by manager with workers 
as one team, and the performance of the team is evaluated with reference to the job 
plan measures. Incentive compensation is traced to the whole firm, wherever 
inter-team involvement exists. 
Introduction 
I n practice, Management Control Systems (MCS) such as decision rights, performance evaluation 
and incentive compensation vary both with j n and across the fi rms. A majority of management 
accounting studies employ contingency theory to examine why MCS vary {Chenh2lil, 2003 
and Fisher, 1995). Contingency theory is based on the premise thatthe appropriateness of an 
MCS design for a firm is determined by the circums1ances (e.g., environment or technology) 
that impacts the firm (Otley, 1999). Further, the theory examines variations in one or more 
MCS elements and not the overall design (Spekle, 2001). Spekle contends that the use of 
contingency theory does not offer a generalized and pervasive answer for why MCS vary. 
A few prior management accounting studies (Spicer and Ballew, 1983; Tiessen and 
Waterhouse, 1983) identify the potentia! for using Transadfon Cost Economics nCl] theory 
to examine the MCS of a firm. These studies state that the attributes of a transaction can 
determine the design of a firm's Mes. Van cler Meer Kooistra (994) Van der Meer Koolstra 
(1994) and Col bert a nd Spicer {1 995) develop TeE-based models, and empi rically, exam ine 
the MCS that underlie firms' internal transfer pricing processes. However, the models are 
specific to firms' transfer pricing transactions, and not other internal transactlons. 
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$pekle (200 1) is one of the very few who bu lids a more genera I TeE model of MCS, which 
states that when a firm executes an asset specific transaction, the MeSs are more likely to 
involve greater information sharing and deciSion part\c\patlon among the employees. Asset 
specificity refers to a firm's investment that is exclusively used to conduct a transaction whose 
value in altem6te transactions i5 little. An example of a specific asset is a mold that is bu ift to 
produce a specific product. However, Spekle dOe5 not examine his TCE model of MCS 
empirically and I:l Iso adm its that the constructs used in the model can be difficu It though not 
impossible to measure in practlce. 
The author addresses the gaps in Spekle (200n in the paper by building a different butstiU 
a general TeE model of MCS, and empirically, analYZing the mode1. The association between 
th ree overaJ I and i oterreI ated elements of MCS (I.e., -de6sion rights, performance eva I uatlon 
and incentive compensation} and one type of asset specificity, namely knowledge is examined. 
The research qU6tion relates to how knowtedge specificity impacts MCS design with in firms. 
Knowledge is a critical specific asset in a firm's internal transactions (Alchian and Densetz, 
1972; Williamson, 1981 a). K!ein et al. (1978, p. 302) argue that an "employee could effectively 
cheat the owner of the asset with h is special ized knowledge"". Jensen and Meckl·, ng {1992) 
suggest that firms adapt their control systems {or MCS) to manage such problems. However, 
few papers docum~nt why and how firms adapt thei r MCS design to suit different levels of 
·knowledge specificity. The documentation is useful for practitioners in designing appropriate 
MCS for a firm, which faces different levels of knowledge specificity. 
Categorizing the internal transadions of firms into low and high knowledge specificity, 
different MCS features for the two categories in the TCE model of MCS are. identified. The tow 
knowledge specificity is related to Jensen and Meckling's (1992) concept of general knowledge, 
which refers to skills that arE: easy to transf.er and avallabte for replication for other future 
transactions. There is less need for the manager to deptive decision management rights to the 
workers.lhe manager achieves efficiency by centralizing most of the rights and delegating 
merely the execution right to the workers. The manager uses task standards to evaluate how his 
workers have performed their execution right and motivates better performance by tracing 
incentive com pensation to the individual workers-'1dSks. 
In contrast, high knowledge specificity implies the presence of sPKific knowledge, which 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1992) is dispersed in bits among individuals, and costly to 
transfer. To enable the work.€;!S 10 coHate "the dispersed b·li:s of knowledge and then conduct the 
transaction, the manager fi rst decentral izes the decision management rights to worker teams, 
and evaluates only the overall team periormance against specifiC job plans. The resources 
required val)' for each job, and thus. specific task standards. are less lik-ely to e}(ist. The manager 
motivates the teams in achieving the job plans by tracing incentive compensation to the 
teams. Team rewards may prompt some workers to act opportunistically by 'free-riding' on 
their coworkers. The manager, therefore, uses subjective eva Ivations of i i1d 1vidual workers as a 
basis for aUocating the team rewards. To reduce the problems of a manager, favoring preferred 
workers with higher subjective scores, CEOs direct managers to obtain coworkers' peer scores 
as part of individual workers' subjective evaluation (Brickley et aC 2001;. 
Once built! a theoretical model must be empirically examined to enhance its explanatory 
value (Hamel et a/. j 1993). The author uses. the Product Varie-ty Slra1E:gy (PVS) as a context 
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and proxy to mea-sure the qualitative independent variable, knowledge specificity. Dra\ving 
support from the PVS literature {Goldhar and lei, 1995; Bouwens and Ab~rnethy, 2000; and 
Salvador eta/., 2002), f~rm-specified and customer~specified pvs to low and high know!edge 
specificity are related, respectively. To empidcal ~y examine the TCE model in four manufaauri ng 
units based in New Zealand, appropriate case study method is employed, because the TCE 
model, which considers firms' in-depth internal processes, can be refined through detailed 
analyzes of a few case studies. 
The author adopts Yin's (1994) scientific principJes to enhance internal and external validity 
especially in a case study setting. YIn contends that the goa! of the case study method is to 
genera! ize the fi ndings to the theory as agal nst the popu lation. Theoretical (a~so called analytic) 
generalization refers to identifyi ng how and why a relation (e.g.~ A causes B) may exist between 
two variables, rather than fi nd i ng with a specified !evel of confidence that the stated relation 
exists be1:\veen two variables. This distinction offers a new dimension to the traditional view, 
wh ich holds that case fi ndi ngs cannot be general ized to the popu lation. 
The fi ndings suggest that in finn-spec1fied PVS, decisi on management is central ized except 
the execution right. Performance is evaluated on i nd ivid ual task standards for th rough put and 
team;based standards for safety and quality. The incentive compensation is traced to the individual 
performance in throughput and team performance in safety and quality, but offered only if the 
firm achieves its budgeted profits. In customer-specified ..... PVS, the manager shares decision 
management rights and forms teams together with his workers. The overall performance of the 
team is evaluated with reference to job plans, but incentive compensation is traced to the 
whole firm wherever inter-team involvement exists. The underlying reasons are consistent 
with the theory, where the MCS vary with knowledge specificity. 
TeE Model of MCS 
Justifying the Need for the Model 
I n genera!, TCE model proposes that the choice of a governance structure such as the market 
or a firm to gover~ a transaction depends on the attributes, i.e., asset specificity, uncertainty 
and frequency of the transaction. Asset specificity refers to the un iq l1eness of an asset involved 
in a transaction. Investment in a specific asset can increase dependence and scope for 
opportunism (contracti ng problems) among the parties. Uncertainty captu res the unpredictable 
nature of the tasks and behavi or of the transacti ng parties. Frequency refers to the recu rrenee 
of the transactions. Among the tra nsactlon attributes, Wi! I iamson {1981 b} cons iders asset 
specificity as the important attribute, because the other two merely serve to increase the 
effects of asset specifi city. 
When asset specificity intensifies, TeE model predicts that parties organize their transactions 
through fi rms rather than the market, because fi rms have better admi ni strative co n tro is wh icn 
help in economizing their overall transaction costs. Even in the market, the parties can 
have access to adjudication processes such as courts but the process is time--consuming and 
costly. The model has been traditionally applied to decide between the market and the firm 
structures (Shelanski and Klein, 1995). However, even \;vithin a firm structure, 
Williamson (1996, pp. 43~4) suggests that the choices among "alternate firm designs'" 
{e.g., MCS) a Iso depend on the tranSaction cost economi zi ng properties of the designs. 
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Spicer and Ballew (1983) and Tiessen and VVaterhouse {19831 Me among the early 
management accounting papers that describe the role of TeE in relation to MeS. Considering 
MC5 as a governance structure, they argue th.at TeE holds the potential to explain how firms 
design their MCS because of TCE's ability to interpret different choices ih terms of transaction 
cost economizing principle, Van der Meer-Kooistra al1d Vossefman {lOQO} examine the MCS 
implications of outsourdng transactions among·firms.. Van der Meer-Kooistra (1 994) and Colbert 
<?lind Spicer (1995) develop TCE-based models, and also empirically, examine how and why 
MCS that underlie firms' transfer pricing policies differ. However, these models are specific to 
transfer pricing fransactions. 
> Spekie (2001 j fills this gap by developing a general TCE model of MeS. Drawing MCS 
conSlructs from the management accounti ng literature, Spek Ie btl ilds his model to explai n that 
the <:hoite of a particular MCS design is dependent on the intensity of asset specificity. I(the 
intensity generates contracting problems that can be mitigated by a specific design, saYI 
decentralizationf then firms facing such problems will likely decentralize than centralize. 
However, Spekle does not examine his TeE model empirically. Spekle {po 439) admits that the 
MC$ constructs in his modet (arms-length! boundary, exploratol)' and machine controls) "'may 
help to recognize general tendencies but. .. may not be de$criptively ao:: u rate" . 
The above limitations are addressed by bui Id! ng a general TeE model wh ich draws MCS 
constructs from other organizational economic frameworks (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen 
and Meekl ing, 1992; Brickiey et af., 2001). The MCS constructs used in my model are more 
easily observable in practice. Furtherf the model unifies ideas from related frameworks in 
organizational economics literature. 
Defining Knowledge Specificity and MCS 
Knowledge in the form of 1 nformation, experience and skills is a critical form of asset specificity 
that exists with i 11 fi rms ('Will iarmon, 1981 b). The author disti ngu ishes knowledge specificity 
into low and high categories, which are related to Jensen and Meekl i ng' s (1992) general and 
specific knowledge constructs, respectively. low knowledge specificity implies that the transaction 
requires general knowledge which is available ex ante with the firm. The manager knows what 
he expects from his workers, and the workers are" aware of their responsibilities.. The parties are 
less dependent 0" each other, and thus, the scope for opportunism is low. Neither the workers 
not the manager can hide information to gain unfai r personal wealth. H iSh knowledge specifidty 
implies that the transaction requires specific knowiedge, which is iess applicable for other 
transactions. The manager does not know what to expect of his workers (though he may have 
overall expectations) and the workers hold bi ts of dispersed knowledge. The parties are mote 
dependent on each other to collate bits of knowledge E'X post and make them usable for the 
transaction in hand. The increased dependence is associated with contracting problems, wh ich 
is expl<:\i ned as: 
42 
TCE suggests that contracting problems arise with DNO rna in assu mptlons: opportu nism 
and bounded rationality. !f scope exists, the pdrties may seek to pursue their 
self-interest at the cost of the other party. further, the parties possess limited menta! 
abi! ities to foresE!'e all futu re contingencies. The combjnation of these tw"o assumptions 
makes each party fear that the other one may seize an unfair advantage.. To protect their 
interests, the parties in a firm build adequate safeguards. 
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The author now defines the MCS var,ables used in the modeL The management accounting 
! iterature tovers a wide range of MCS variables such as: {1} styles or characteristics of MCS 
such as Hopwood's {1972) bodget-constrained, profit-conscious and non~accounting controls, 
Merchant's (1981) adion, results and personnel COntrols, Ouchi's (l979) Input, ootput and 
behavior controls, Ouch iJ 5 (1 980) clan, bu reaucracy and market controls, and Simon's (1991} 
diagnostic and interactive controls; {2) systems of MCS such as standard costing, variance 
analysis, master and flexible budgets, and responsibility centers by Argyris 0952;, 
Anthony (1 965t Otley (1994); and (3) elements of MCS such as decision rights, performance 
evaluation and incentive compensation by Vancil (1979L Flarnholtz: {1983} and 
Otley (2001, 2003). 
The organizational economics literature {Brickley ('t ai., 2001 and Jensen and Meekl i ng, 1992) 
focuses mainly on the last set of variables, i.e., the elements of Mes. While the 
management accounting literature does not analyze the interactions among the different MCS 
elements (Otley, 1999, p. 369), the organizational econom ics literature examines the interactions 
in terms of how a change in one element leads to changes in the other two (Zimmerman, 1997). 
Since the TU model examines potentia! links among MCS elements, the organizational economics 
literature is followed to define the MCS variables which are decision rights, performance 
evaluation and incentive compensation. Further, when the MCS definition is based on 
organizational economics literature, the economic role of MCS in firms can be stated as: 
The price systetn in the market ensures that assets .are acquired by parties 'Nho val ue them 
the most. Further, the party puts the asset toa proper use and maintenance in order to earn 
high returns_ Thus, the price system in the market automatically allocates appropriate 
decision rights, enables high performance and motivation for the parties Oensen and 
Mecklin& 1992 and Wi Iliam son , 1981 b), As firms do not have such automatic advantages, 
firms need MCS to determine appropriate decision rights to workers, measure their 
performance and i ncentivize them. I n the fol lowing section, 1 place the manager-worker 
transactions withi n tow and high knowledge specificity categories and explain how firms 
could design MCS for each of them 1. 
HypOthesis 1: Low Knowledge Specificity and MCS 
When knowledge specificity is low, knowledge can be used for severa I recurrent transactions, 
Consider that a manager transacts with his workers to make some products specified in the 
technical brochures. The workers follow the steps listed in the procedure manuals and complete 
the production. As manuals are 'assembled' general knowledge that exists ex arHe, the specificity 
of the knowledge to any particlJ lar transaction is low, The parties (managers and workers} th us 
have less scope to misuse knowledge to enhance their util ity at the cost of each other. The 
contracting problems are likely to be less. The design of MCS for low knowledge specificity is 
now examined beginning with decision rights. 
!n decision rights, two bro~d groups exist: decision management and control (Farna and 
Jensen, 19B3}. Vilhile decision management covers i nitration and execution of a project, decision 
1 Wruck and Jensen {1994J and (hrjStEe e! al. (2003} adopt Ih ree broad hierarchical leveis among employees: {l) 
CEOs. m milnager.>, and (3) workE'='5, th~5 papefexamine~ !ran~dlOrlS a~jsing be!we~n setoncl and third ~evel~. 
i.e., m.,nage.-s and workers. 
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contra! i ncl udes approvi ng decisions and mon itori ng of performance. In F arna and Jensen's 
classification, 'planning' fS inherent in both decision management activities of initiation and 
execution. However, planning is a separate decision management right because it may be 
carried out by different parties under low and high levels of knowledge specificity. 
Decision control is generally retained by the manager, when s/he transacts with workers.. 
Th is paper focuses on decision management rights {i nitiation, plann i ng and executionl, which 
arE! more likely to change. 
To medi<3te low knowledge specificity, the manager retains both initiation and planning 
rights, and me'rely, a I locates the execution right to workers to perform sti pu lated tasks. Tn is is 
because the initiation a.nd planning activities have al ready been documented for future reference. 
The organ izational econom ics literatu re treats such an allocation as central ized and relates it 
with cost centers (Bri(:k!ey et ai" 2001; Mi !grom and Roberts/ 1992; Wi Iliamson, 1975; and 
Vancil,. 1979). Cost centers emphasize on operational efficiencies, i.e" maximize output for a 
given cost m minimize costs for a given output (Brickley et at, 2001). Further, cost centers do 
not determi ne sales prices or volu me. 
DeciSion management and pertotmance evaluation are associated to- each other. As workers 
exercise only their execution rights, the manager needs only simple standards for different 
tasks to eval uate the workers' performance. Examples of task standards incl ude nu'mber of 
units prod ucect defective un its and prodUdlon ti me, These measu res verify if workers have 
achieved the- manager's ex ante expectations. 
The mere delegation of execution righ1 and identification of task sta ndards may not help a 
firm to achieve its objectives, unless the workers are motivated to perform 
(Brickley et a/ ... 2001). A simple vtlay to motivate workers in low knowledge specific transactions 
is to relate incentive compensation to the achieveffi€nt of IaSk st.andards. As workers' efficiencies 
are verifiable, the i nc.entive compensation is directly traceable to i ndividual wo~kers. Note 
that low knowledge specificity is managed by individual oriented MeS, Further, the three 
MCS variables are interrelated. 
The above arguments. summarize Hypothesis 1 as: Where knowledge specificity in a transaction 
is low,. the manager 1$ Ii kely to centralize all decision management rights other than the execution 
right, which is delegated to the individual workers, adopt task standards to evaluate the individual 
workers' performance and trace incentive compensation to the individual workers. 
Hypothesis 2; High Knowfecige Specificity Jnd MCS 
When a fi 1'111 receives a customer order for wh ich there is I ittle prior knowledge, the manager 
di reets workers to col late dispersed bits of knowledge avai lab Ie among them. Workers pool 
their knowledge bits ex post to gather new knowledge that is enough to conduct the 
transadion, as a whole. The pooled new knowledge is spe<::ific to the current transaction and 
no! other transactions. The manager and the workers become dependent on each other, which 
in tum, gives rise to contracting problems (\JVilliamson, 1981a). For instance, a worker may 
h ide his or her inefficiencies and b lame a coworker for the I?w product quality. The manager 
;nay not be abJe to clearly trace .. who is responsible for the problem, The paper then analyzes 
how MCS are designed for managl ng transactions of high specificity. 
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On decision management, the manager delegates al! the rights (initiation, planning and 
execution) to a 'team' of workers, whose members hold the specific knowledge in diverse bits. 
The organ izationai econom iC$ i iterature (Brickley et ai., 200 1; Mi Igram and Roberts 1992· , , 
and Williamson, 1975) recognizes that partitioning all the decision management rights 
characterizes a 'decentralized' structure. Also called profit centers, the decentralized units 
emphasize maxi mization of profits by i ncreasi ng both operational efficiencies and sales value. 
Profit centers hoI d decision rights rela.ting to costs, sa les vol u me and pri ceo 
The delegation of decision management rights is related to performance evaluation. 
As worker teams j n itlate and pia n the tasks for each job ex post, task standa rds cannot be set 
at the beginning of a year. As teams determine the job plans, the manager evaluates merely 
the overall team output {e.g., ~hether the job is completed according to the job plans) to 
eval uate penormance. The workers may engage in opportu nism (such as hiding inefficiencies) 
si nee they are aware that task sta ndards do not exist to eval uate thei rind ivid ual perlormance. 
To reduce such behavior, the manager uses subjective measures such as aptitude to work and 
team spirit to evaluate individual workers (Brickley er al. .. 2001). However, subjective 
I nformatlon is djfficu It to observe, and hence, managers may also resort to opportu n ism 
such as favoring their preferred workers. To ensure equity, CEOs direct managers to use 
coworkers' reviews as one way to collect subjective information on workers 
(Brickley el al.). 
As on Iy the worker team's performance 1 s verifiable, the incentive compensation is traced 
to the whole team, wh ich is then allocated among the workers. The basis of allocation may 
vary on either equal amounts or in proportion to the individual pay scales. If any specific 
worker engages in opportun istic behaVior, the manager uses the subjective eva! uation to reduce 
the amount of incentive compensation that is allocated to the defaulting worker. The subjective 
indices are balanced by peer workers' reviews to reduce the possibility of managerial 
opportunism. In summary, theMeS design is sufficiently complex to manage the contracting 
problems that arise with high knowledge specificity. 
The above arguments summarize Hypothesis 2 as: When the knowledge specificity in a 
transaction is high, the manager is likely to decentralize all decision management rights to 
worker teams, adopt job plans to eval uate team perfonnance and trace incentive compensation 
to the teams before allocating the compensation to individual workers. 
The Context and Research Method 
The Context 
The author uses the Produd Variety Strategy (PVS) as a proxy and a context to examine knowledge 
specificftyJ because the latter can then be observed in practice. The term product variety is 
defined in different levels (as models or options) in the PVS literature. For instance, bicycles 
constitute one prod uct line with! n the two-wheeler industry. Wi thi Q th is prod uct I ineJ different 
models that cater to different markets such as mountain and racing bikes exist. Within every 
model, various options on pedals, seats and wheels are offered. Further, PYS may arise from 
either firm or customer specifications (Kekre and Srin i vasa n, 1990 it nd MacDuffie er a)., 1996}. 
Whi Ie fi rm specifications reflect various models and options designed a nd manufactured by the 
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fim\ customer specifiC<l.tions cover models and options that are conceived by individual OJstomers"'. 
Th is paper defi nes product variety as constituti ng both models and options \.\!irhin a particu tar 
product line that are 5pecifled by either the firm or the customers, and relates fi rrn-speci fled PVS 
to low. knowledge specificity and customer-specified PVS to high specificity. 
The choice of the proxy to capture the underlYing theoretical construct (low and high 
knowledge specificity) is supported in both management accounting and PV5 literatures. 
Bouwens and Abernerhy (2000} examine how MCS changes when firms increase the levels of 
prod.uct customization. They find that increased customization increases interdependence 
among firms' employees, which in turn, increase:. the need for MCS information to be integrated, 
aggregated and timely. The interdependence occur~ because of increasing knowledge 
specialization that 1$ dispersed among different parties. 
Goldhar and Lei 0995, p. 79) also identify that as firms move towards customized 
product variety, new forms of knowledge such as the "ability to process and tr~n5fer 
information and skills among its subunits, 5uppliers a.nd customers'" become critkaL In 
transacting with extemal supplier5, Salvador el at. (2002) identify that for products with 
standard features ... fi rms retai n d~cision rights wh j I e for non-standa rd featu res, fi rms form 
joint ve:ntures. Salvador el al., (2000) suggest that knowledge is dispersed and specialized in 
relation to making customized products. 
Research Method 
To examine the TeE mode! which explains that firms design jndividual-oriented MCS to 
manage tow knowledge specificity (proxied by fi rm-specified PVS) and team-oriented MCS to 
manage high knowledge specificity (proxied by customer-spedfi ed PVS)r case study research 
method is used. This method is appropriate for empiricaHy examinlnga newtheoreticaJ mode" 
particularly, when the model predicts the underlying reasons for a context 
{Hamel et at, 1993 and Yin~ 1994). Case study method enables the researcher to verify the 
model through multiple- in-depth interviews, which can be triangulated by interviews from 
other sou rces along with documents <;lnd di reet observations (Yin, 1 994), 
Yin {1994, pp. 9-10) states that the case study method has been a subject of disdain for 
two reasons: (1) the method has. been adopted with a I ack of rigor ina • sloppy rnanner that 
allows equivocal evidence to influence the direction of the findings""; and {2} the lack of a 
basis for generalizing one or a few case unit findings to the population. For the fkstcriticism, 
Yin suggests that the case study researcher mlJst identify specific solutions. for all the 
method-related problems. In a scientific research just as one does under surveyor experimental 
methods. For the second criticism, Yin proposes that case units offer mu!tiple evidences to 
find the reasons for- a theoretical model, <3.nd the findings are analytically generalized back to 
the theory. The analytic generalization concept is exp! ai ned in detal lin the later section. For 
the both criticisms, Yi n argues that a case study researcher mu st adopt the principles of sci ence 
from the first step (theoretical model) till the last (analytic generalization). 
~ Note that there can b'! v.;lrialions wi1nin firm· and cuswmet·specified PV5. for instance.. a firm-specified PVS may 
cove. only model <3nd nD op!;on variety {~.g .• soft drinks). Simil2r1y. a cu~tomer.speCmed PVS can design and 
offer new Opt"t(ln5, but only with'm the e;":I~;ing model vafie'., (e.g., mobile pllOJ'lt?$). On a relative b.?~-~s, Ihe 
knnwledgl':' speciftc!ty varies between the IwO. 
46 The Idai journal of An:ounting Reseaf"ch, Vo!. VI, Nfi. 1, 2{J07 
Sdence holds its roots in pragmatic problems of rea! life. A scientific research is a "systematic, 
controlled, empirical and critical investigation of natural phenomena guided by theory and 
hypotheses about the presu med relations among such phenomena" (Ked i nger a nd lee, 1999, 
p. 15). The paper adopts the TeE theory to guide hypotheses, which eX<lmines the phenomena of 
MCS varIations across firms. These phenomena are examined using case study method andYin's 
n 994) scientific approach. The approach identifies dIfferent ways to enhance reliability and 
validity, which are unique to a case study setting. 
i 
! ; 
! 
I 
The author uses a 2 * 2 design with two case 1I nits for each of the l:\NO opposit~ contexts of 
firm-specified and customer-specified PVS, as indicated in Table 1. 
I 
! 
Case Units! 
l 
Table 1: A. 2'"'2 Case Study Research Design 
Theoretical Coostruct 
tow Knowledge Spoclficity High Knowledge Specificity 
Proxy or Context 
Fi rm-specified Customer·specined 
P-VS PV5 
T 1. Skope 2. Skope Customs 
~ 
3. Fru~hauf i 4. Adept 
1 
literal Replication 1 (slmr/ar re5ui(s 
1 and 3 expected) 2 and 4 
1 and 2 
Theoretical Replication 
(contrasting rew!ts 
expected) 
.. 3 and 4 , 
The case units 1 and 2 examine how MCS is. designed for firmnspecified and 
customer-specified.PVS, respectively. These. two case units belong to the same firm, Skope 
Industries, while the other two case units {Fruehauf and Adept) are two independent firms. 
The second set of case units, namely units 3 and 4 replicate the study carried out in case 
un its 1 and 2, respectively. Yin (1 994, p. 46) calls the 2 * 2 design as a m u Iti-case study design 
that yields 'theoretical' repl ication, when the study ~xpects contrasti ng resu Its with in each set 
of case units and 'I iteral' repl icatiof<, when the study expects si m i lar resu! ts across wo units 
from different sets, for reasons pred icted by the theory {i .e., case units 1 .and 2 wi II be opposite; 
and so will be 3 and 4. But case units 1 and 3 will be similar; and so wil! be 2 and 4). 
Yin indicates that the replication Jogjc in a case study method 1$ analogous to experiments. If 
one experiment examines tvJO opposite constructs with cOlltrasting results. then a second .' 
experiment done to replicate the first one will be expected to produce contrasting results; 
similar to the first one-
The case un its are non-random Iy chosen such that some pursue fi rm-specified and otners 
customer-specified PVS ""to fil! theoretical Gltegories and provide examples of the po!ar (extr~me) 
types" (Eisenhardt, 1989. p. 537). The first case unit, Skope Refrigeration (Skope), is the main 
division of Skope Industries in Christchurch, wh!ch produces hea~ing and cooiing equipments. 
Skope makes different models and options within commercial refrigeri'ltors to customers in 
New Zealand, Middle East and Au~(a Ii a. Skope designs its models and informs their technical 
and cost details to customers through a technical brochure. Within Skope Industries, a small 
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department (Skope Custom, the second case unit for my study} specializes in making ctlstomized 
refrigerators. When Skope Custom receives a customer order, it develops the complete product 
design and then proceeds to manufacture the order. The output is planned only after receiving 
the order and not stated ex ante in a brochure. While Skope designs and specifies 
tne avaifabfe product variety for customers to make their choices, Skope Custom is wholly 
customer..driven. Skope adopts fi rrn-spec:ified PVS in general except for Skope Custom, wh ich 
pursues customer-specified PVS. 
The th ird case unit, Fruehauf Pacific li mited based in Fei!di ng, manufactures heavy trailers 
for goods transporters and I ivestock carriers. Fruehauf begins its operations by getti ng a product 
specification sheet fi lied in by the potential customer, wh ich I ists the different options avai lable 
for every model and expects customers to mark thei r specific requ irements. Finally, the fourth 
case unit (Adept Lim jted) is an independent Auckland-based firm that bui Ids molds and produces 
h jgh~val ue plastic prod ucts for other firms. The design is deveiopeci wholly from ru:s-tomers' 
ide;]s or prototypes and then used by the molding department to bu i Id moids. While Fruehauf 
indicates its product variety, Adept huilds on customers' ideas to offer product variety and do 
not have ex ante knowledge of their preferences. Fruehauf adopts firm-specified and Adept 
pursues customer~5pecified PV$. Table 2 presents the detaHs of the four case units. 
Note that the two t:ase un its are divisions of a fi nn wh i!e the other tvvo are separate fi rms. 
The unit of analysis is th us any activity center that perfonns all functions such as design, production 
and sales. In each cas~ unit, the produdion managers and workers are the main respondents. 
I [) addition, the design, purchase, final"lCe, marketing and human resource manag~rs are contacted 
to verify the responses, Semi-structu red questionnaires form the basis for expanding the diSO)ssions 
during 1 I'Iterviews.In genera!, the interview data is cross~verjfied with evidence from documents 
.,nd obseNations~ wh lell together, reduce the observer's bias. To understand the processes better, 
multi pIe Visits are made. 
As Yin (1994} suggests, a protocol rewrd of questions and a d~tab.a5e of observations 
(documents and interview digital files) is mai ntai ned for each case unit to enhance reliabi lity. 
The case study reports are also attested by the key respondents in each case firm, which is 
perhaps. a unique feature avai iable in case study research. Internal val id ity relates to the abi lity 
of a study to attribute causation. Yin {p. 33} suggests three methods for enhancing internal 
val idlty in the case study method: {a} pattern-matching, (b) explanation bui Iding, 
and (c) time-series. 
Patt~m-match ing refers to obtai ni ng the expected pattern of relations for each set of dependent 
variabl~s in the case study. Brownell (1995, p. 62) states that if the actual results match 1he 
pred ictlons for not just one but all the dependent varlab les in the group, "there is a stronger 
base for causal inference than if anyone dependent variable alone were to constitute the 
criterion ~. The three MCS vari abies are the dependent variables while knowledge specificity 
(proxied by PVS) is the independent variable in this study. Th~ actual results must match the 
theoretical predictlol'l for not just decision management, but also for performance evaluation 
and incentive compensation to post a stronger internal validity. 
Expianation building is unique to the case study method, wherein a reSe<lrcher collects 
system<ttic evidence from the case sites to build logical explanations for ~ach dependent variable. 
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Table 2: Details of the Case Unit Sites and the Duration of the Visits 
SI;JIUS 
---r --,.-~'~ 
Fruehauf Pacific Skope Refrigeration 
Priv"l~ Manufacj~lrlng Company ! Div(sion of a Privafe 
M'mufacturing Company 
Skope Custom 
Division of Ihe Private Company 
Adept Molding 
?riv.lte 
Com p..'n y 
Mil r! ufact u ri 0& 
f..-..-.~~~~---·t-~ Auckland, NZ loc<ltion 1 Fei!ding, Nl (hristch ~Jr(h, NZ Christchurch, NZ 
~~~---
Prod lI{: l Line.: ! Heavy Transport Trailers Commetciill RefrigerJtors Commcrdal Refrigerators High Value Mold5 
I-- -1·--· 
Produ(~ Mod[!b (e.g) ! l iveslQck, Curti\if1·5id,~r 
,H10 B·tfain Models 
Product 'OpliorH (e.g,,) I Ughts, Ax!es and Painl 
~nform,ltion On rvs prod UtI Specification Sheet 
N<.Iture 01 PVs F irm'spcd fi(~d PVS 
Bilckbar, Counter Chillers 
ilnd Specd.lane Models 
Not SpeCified (GO Claims: Offer 
What Customers Ask} 
Not Specified (Ol.'sign M<lnag(>(: 
Customers Specify) 
------------r---------------
Doors, Handles and Ftnish ! Not Specified Not Specilied 
Technica! Notr.: Cool Booki Quotiltion for EvelY lob Oesign Brief for Every lob 
F i rm,specHieo PVS Customer-specified PVS Cusloml'r-<;pcci lied PVS 
r·-~-~~r~~-~--~-t-------+-~~~~----+---~~"":""""" 
28 mn 0.3 mn 6.5 mn 
10 
• S"I(:s (for .2003 in US$) ! 7 nm 
!N\lmber or Employeps i 63 "I---· ... -·~ r 85 300 
~~~~~~·~·~··i'-"·"~~·~~~·--~~----···-~--·t··· 
Intervil~wc!~S (Main for 1 Oper<lliortS Manager 
~he StJ.ldy) l Sllpervisors 
De~~gn Man<lgC'r 
O~hr.r h,\<!lviewees (for I (hif,r Executive Ofn{"('r 
StrpPOl1 lnformalior)) Commercial M,magcr 
Sales ~ngin!'l~r 
5,11('$ COIlSU ~~ilf11 
OpcriltJon~ Manager Oper<ltions Maniiger Mo~ding Marlilger 
T£;,lffi le",dl~(s Plant PreSiding OffiCf~r Design Manager 
Ch iel Operations omccr Heild Worker General Man,lg(!r 
Head Worker 
Chief Exectltiv(! Officer 
Hum<ln Resource M<llwger 
Design Mi10.,ger 
Ma~nten<lnce M<lIl<lger 
en ief Fini1tlc~~ Officer 
Molding Progr<1mrner 
Pwducnon M<lnager 
Shift M.ln<l8('f 
Project Controller 
_~~~~_~ ................... r 
Human Resource Manager 
BU5ines<, Dev('!op~enl M;ln;l~ 
Nl.lmber oj Site Vis,ts four Four Part of the Vi5il~ to Unit B Four 
·Be!we-;r" OC~200J.()et~~mbe[ 2004 hme 2001·December -2004 --~~-.. ·~~~~f~O:-:--ec-e-n--'lbe:--'r-2-0-03-.-D~ccl)mbm:··2004 
Tot<l~ [)tlr.~!ion of Visits 11 fu Days 15TuTr·o~iY5····--·-·~·-~·· .... ~ .. ,-.--. Nine Full Days -.~ ... --~ 
l.._~_.. _._. __ ~ _ .._~~~ _~_~~~~~~_ 
The purpose is. to see how far the reasons underlying the theoretical predictions hold in actual 
observations. Th is paper holds that MCS is a function of knowledge specificity. The MCS 
I iterature also suggests other variables such as size (Iv1erchant, 1981) and technology (Waterhouse 
and Tiessen, 1978). Explanation bu Hding 1S used to exami ne the alternate or om itted explanations 
to the dependent variable. Ti me-series eval uates a case unit on a longitudi nal basis to exam; ne 
how changes ot:curred. As the study examines fi rrns at a poi nt of ti me, it does not discuss the 
time-series method any further. 
Finally, the results of the four case units,are analyzed and generalized back to the theory. 
Multiple evidences are coll~cted from each case unit to understand the MCS and i nq u ire into 
the reasons that underl ie thei r design. The specific reasons are generalized to a larger analytical 
situation, namely, the theory, just the same way as sample results are generalized to a larger 
representation, name!y" the population. 
Empirical Observations and Analyzes 
Case Units Adopting Firm-specified PVS 
When a customer order arrives, the operations managers at Skope and F rlJehauf identify the 
process flow and sequence before scheduling the manufacture of the order. Thereafter, the 
assistant managers (cai led 'team leaders' in Skope and' supervisors' in Fruehauf} from different 
processes Identify the micro-level tasks to be performed within their respective processes and 
then schedu Ie such tasks. Once sthedu led, the headworkers {called 'process leaders' ~n Skope 
Clnd 'leading hands' in F ruenauf} and thei r group of workers execute the tasks accordIng to the: 
sched ules3 _ The workers execute the tasks by referring to the man ual (called 'Qual ity System' 
in Skope and ILabor Manual' in Fruehauf! andfor by relying on their own experience in having 
carried out the same tasks on priQr occasions. 
The production processes in Fruehauf and in Skope exh ibit the features of cost centers. 
The individual processes are responsible only for ach ieving task efficiencies and not for fixing 
prices and i ncreasi ng sales yolume. The workers in these processes hold only execution rights 
and not initiation and planning rights, which are retained by the managers. Further, the entire 
work flows in a step-by-step sequence from the opE'erations manager to the assistant manager.s, 
and finally, to the workers. 
The decision rights allocation is Ii nked to tne way performance ios eva I uated in both firms. 
The operations managers €Naluate the assistant managers' task schedules only on exceptions, 
because the assistant managers are experienced in their work that has changed only a little over 
time. The worKers' tasks are governed by standards, wh ich are recorded in the rnanua I or any 
other work process plans. 
The operations manager at Skope ~valuates three main performance areas: safety, quality 
and productivity. For each of the three areas, the operations manager identifies measures such 
~~""" __ '--L""_''''' ____ ~~' ____ ~.'''''' _~ __ • ...........--__ .... ....-- '..--- .. -.~ - ',' ------
J The fob de5<'rlptions. :-!ale tr,<J! teGlm leader.;,!,lIperviwr:; must do rnani:lgefl.::ti (planning and coordination) artivi· 
Ite5 wni1e proces~ ie2derslie<liding nands m\Jst carry out daily produC:io:"t, a!ong with rhe coordination of :n~jr 
worker leams. F urthe~, the ~;'lterv·te'>'" fespon~ confinn that while protes~ leade~leading hands do get overtimf' 
pay, the team leaders./supe:visors do rtOt. Note that overtime pGty is given only 10 won.:ers. .3:nO not 10 managers. 
Yin (199-4, p. 34) ~uggE'5ts that (;.3se study data must bui1d such a 'chatn oi evidence' to jnCN'..a:;e COrt"truct vaHdlly. 
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as Lost Ti me I nj u ries (L Tis) for safety, Cost of Qual ity (CoQ} for quality and either output 
(units finished) or time-based (hours consumed) measures for productivity. l Tis refer to the 
number of times .a worker drops work due to injuries. The lower the LTlsl the better the 
worker!s safety performance. CoQ is captured by the value added, which is lost when units ;are 
scrapped due to low qua lity. The maximum number of un its that can be scrapped in a period 
is set once every' six months. The standard for CoQ is the total budgeted cost of the allowed 
scrap units upto the poi nt,. where the un its are scrapped. 
The operations manager and the supervisors in Fruehauf adopt task standards based on 
labor hours set in the Labor Manual for evaluating individual workers' productivity. The operations 
manager admits that there are no qual ity-related standards for each task at present. However, 
materia! usage and rework are evaluated on an overall basis both on weekly meetings and on 
the completion of evety customer Qrder. Safety concerns are evaluated on an overall basis as 
and when needs arise. 
The observations in both firm~specified case units reveal that performance measures are 
based on standards for individual tasks. The reasons cited for using task standards converge 
toward low knowledge specificity, i.e., the managers and workers know ex ante what is expected 
of eacn other. As each task is measurable, individual workers can be held accountable for the 
tasks that they perform. An exception arises here. Though task standards are traceable to 
individual workers, the operations managers in Skope and Fruehauf trace the safety and 
quality-related performance to teams (rather than to individuals) because team-based evaluation 
enables workers to reduce opportu n ism. Opportunism arises here when a worker is indifferent 
to a coworker's loss of safety or quality. The objective of the operations managers is to curb 
incentives to workers to enhance their own utility by reducing the overall value of the firm. 
The author now tu rns towards the design of incentive compensation in Skope and Fruehauf. 
In Skope, the fj rst condition for incentive compensation is that the company must ach ieve 
its budgeted profits. The workers are entirJed to recejye incentive compensation 
(called 'incentives' in Skope) proVided that they meet the task standards set for a six-month 
period. The first condition is based on the logic of the theory of constra!nts~ if goods remain 
unsold even if the workers produce efficiently, there is no purpose in proViding incentives. 
Once the condition is met, the underlying theme is that the workers must be able to control 
what they get as incentives. 
In Fruehaut the workers are entitled to their incentive compensation (known as 'bonus' 
in Fruehauf) if the company saves On the standard labor hou r5 for all the completed customer 
orders. The savings are placed in a bonus pool which, in turn, is distributed to the workers 
based on their individual contributions measured in terms of proouctive hours worked. Productive 
hours are the tota: I hours contri buted by the workers inc! ud i ng work-in~proc:ess but exciudes 
house-keeping time. The operations manager holds that scheme motivates i ndivid ual workers 
to find ways to improve performance. If a worker increases hislher productive hours, he/she 
can increase the amount of bonus. As the bonus scheme is new, the CEO holds that it has 
scope for improvement. For instance, if the non-productive hours incl !.Ide rework, then workers 
can be motivated to find ways to reduce rework as well. Table 3 works out hypothetical 
n umbers under the incentive comper1sati on schemes of both the fi rm-speci fjed case un its. 
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Table 3~ Incentive Compensation in the Case Units Adopting Firm-spedfied PVS 
Fruehauf Pacific 
Assume the following. Completed orders ina period: ten; Standard time allowed for the .ten 
orders.: 6000 hours; Actual time taken: 5000 hours. Rate: $25 per hour. Total productive 
hours consumed by all the workers in the perioo (induding on work-in-process): 8000 hour5. 
I 
Productive hours include actual time spent by a worker on an order minus any housekeep~ng 
time. Worker 'A' provides 200 productIve hours. 
, Basis of Computation Amount 
Stage 1 Determini ng the bonus pool: 
Standard .labor hours saved for an the completed (6000.-5000) ,., $25 
Orders during a period '" rate per hour == $25,000 
! Stage 2 Distribution to individual workers: 
, 
Individual workers' productive hours/total ! (200/8000) "" 25,000 
contribution of all the workers i .., $625 
Note: If worker 'A' increases his productive time to 220 hours, given other factors constant, 
the bonus increases to $685 
! Skope Refrigeration 
i ! Number of process leaders who are entitled to receive incenfive compensation are ten. Maxi~um 
! I amount available to all the process leaders are $15,000. The amount paid depends on the three 
) I measures: l Tis, CoQ and units p~uced. The targets for the measures are as follows: three L ns ! 
I for the entire factory; $500 CoQ for say, the folding process; 350 units to be folded. The weights 
are 20% for LTls; 30% for CoQ and 50% for the number of units processed. Consider the actual 
performance to be four l Tis, $500 in CoQ and 3 i 5 folds processed. 
Basis of Computation Amount 
Stage 1 Determining the bonus pool: 
The firm must first achieve its budgeted profits. 
If so, the amount is: maximum amount for all the 15,000/10 
"" 
$1500 
process leaders/number of process leaders 
Srage 2 Determining ·actual weights: 
L Tis: standard allowed/actua! achieved ., 20% ¥.i * 20% 
-
15%+ 
COQ: stand.ard cost/actual cost .. 30% 1 * 30% = 30%+ 
Units: actual units/stand.ard units ., 50% 31 5/350" 50% = 45% 
Actual weight 90% 
Stage 3 Distributi ng to a process leader {say, A): 
Actual weight ., maximum amount 90~'" of $1500 "" $1350 
~ 
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In summary, the MCS design is, largely similar when the Skope study is replicated in 
Fruehauf. In both firm-specified PVS case units, manag~r5 use ex:1sting general knowledge 
to conduct transactions with their workers. The case units provide evidence consistent 
with Hypothesis 1 in respect of decision management rights. The evidence is inconststent 
with Hypothesis 1 in relation to performance eval uation <lnd incentive compensation, where: 
• The task standards used in both case units are used to eva I uate individual perfonnance 
in respect of th rough put and team performa nce for safety and qual ity; 
• The incentive compensation in Skope is dependent on the firm achieving its budgeted 
profit and on team performance in the areas of safety and quality and individual 
performance in throughput, and the incentive compensation is currently paid to the 
head worker (and not yet offered to other workers); and 
The incentive compensation in Fruehauf is first traced to teams through a bonus 
pool and then allocated to the workers based on each worker's contribution to the 
team in terms of productive hou rs. 
Though the performance eva! uation and incentive compensation elements of the find j ngs 
are not consistent with Hypothesis 1 t the evidence exists that the three MCS elements are 
interrelated. This is in line with Yin's (1994) pattern-matching principle. Workers hold only 
the execution right, for producing good (quality) units efficiently (throughput) without harm 
{safety). Though safetyl quaHty and throughput can be traced to ind ivid ual performance, having 
safety and quality as team-based measures reduces opportun ism. The incentive scheme is also 
linked to whether performance 15 evaluated on team or individual basis in Skope. Though 
Fruehauf does not have safety and quality in its incentive scheme, there is no theoretically 
contradictory signal. The scheme does not say that bonus is traced to individual safety and 
qua! ity performance, wh i Ie havi ng these measu res eva !uated on team basis. 
Case Units Adoptjng Customer-spedfjed PVS 
In Skope Custom, the presiding officer, operations manager and the headworker (known as 
'processleader'J initiate and plan the overall tasks together as a team. Thereafter, the process 
leader determines the micro-level tasks and obtains the operations manager's approval to 
finalize the tasks_ The operations manager uses his experience and the overa!1 plan made by 
the team as reference points to approve the process leaders plans. Once approved j the process 
leader builds price quotations before executing the tasks. Generally, the marketing manager 
upwardly reviews these prices. The process leader also obtains help in execution from the 
operations manager, should emergencies (such as design changes) emerge. 
The Adept managers follow a similar pattern, i.e., initiate and plan the overall tasks with 
thei r workers as teams. Though the workers determ ine and execute the micro-level tasks, the 
managers hel pin execution in times of emergencies. A mai n difference between the fv.to case 
units-Skope Custom and Adept~rel.ates to the structuring of the design and production 
functions. wh ile Skope Customl being a small case unit, carries out the design and production 
functions in one department, Adept performs the functions in two separate departments. 
However, the employees In design and production departments in Adept interact with e~ch 
other. For instance, the production (cal led Molding) manager is a part of the Adept's Deslgn 
Comm ittee that p! ans and approves mo Id i ng designs. 
Knowledge Specificity in Management Control System Design: A Case Study Evide:ncE': 53 
The evidences (i ntervievvs, job descriptions and obselVations) from both customer-specified 
PVS fi rms converge to su pport that managers do not delegate deci sion management rights to 
work.er teams. All the rights of j nitiation, planning and execution are inextricably shared 
among managers and workers. The workers are involved in planning {e.g., building price 
quotations) while the managers are engaged in execution. The decision management rights do 
not flow sequentially top-down, but flow reciprocally both ways. 
Though knowledgespec1ficity is viewed as the determinant of reciprocal teamwork in both 
case units, the human resources manager of Adept also states the explanation of 'small company 
culture'. She believes that reciprocal sharing of decision management rights which is the 
oJiture of a small company continues fo exist in Adept though it is growing. The small 
Company culture and know!edge spedficity may not be competing explanations as both are 
endogenous with the nature of customer-specified PVS. The de:sign and manufacture of 
customer~specified product variety require high knowledge specificity, which is dispersed 
tnroughout the firm. This requires reciprocal sharing, which is more naturally present In a 
small company. Both explanations are possible and likely to operate synchronously. 
Regarding performance evaluation, the operations manager and the presiding officer verify 
ifSkope Custom gets throughput (sales value minus direct material costs) of at least 50"1" of its 
direct labor. Even if Skope Custom is not fully profitable, the operations manager justifies its 
existence, because the output of Skope Custom is lInked to other customer orders for 
finn-.specified product variety. Further, Skope Custom assumes the role of a research center 
that subsumes all the complexities of customization. However, in practice, Skope Custom 
covers all its di reet labor costs because the prices are generally hiked upwards from what the 
process leader quotes. Along with the overall throughput measure, the operations manager 
a!s.o evaluates the number of jobs completed and scheduled completion dates. 
In Adept, the managers of design and molding departments evaluate their actual 
performance against the quotations that they provide to customers. The quotations build a 
'charge out time', i.e., hours quoted for the job. In a period, the departments may complete 
most jobs with i n and a few jobs beyond the charge out ti me. So long as the total consu med 
hall rs are with in the charge out ti me for all compl eted jobs, the departments contribute to 
the firm's profitabil ity. 
The specific measures {such as charge-out time} are constructed from out of the detailed 
tasks for each customer order. However, the two case units do not use the detai led task 
measu res to eval uate individual workers. This is because the performance on these measu res 
reflects the combined efforts in initiation ~nd planning by both managers and workers together 
a nd not just the workers who u hi mately execute the job. Si nee the tasks are performed in. a 
redprocal manner, the detailed task measures are less meaningfu I as standards unless collated 
together as an overall measu reo 
With no standards, individual efficiencies are not clearly observable. This gives scope 
individuals to engage in opportunism such as free-riding and work slow down. Further, 
the managers may not know, where performance can be improved. To control such behavior, 
managers lJse subjective measures including aptitude to work, team spirit and integrity to 
evaluate individual performance. For Skope Custom, the operations manager states: 
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"'I.t is difficult. .. You cannot say that they {Skope custom emp loyees) have to do 20 units 
next month; because you can sudden Iy get one that takes you two week$. To start to 
come up with a formula to measure !ndiv~dual performance, you would need a rocket 
scientist.. .50, that is where the subjective side of it {helps}. It sort of suits that area. ~ 
As Skope Custom is a small department/ the operations manager knows all his workers. 
Peer review is the way that Adept follows to obtai n subjective i niormation of a worker. Such 
reviews avoid complaints of managerial bias in subjective eval uations. In summa~. the two 
customer-specified PVS case units use overall measures (profitability and scheduled completion 
dates) combined with subjective measures to evaluate individual efficiencies. 
On incentive compensation in Skope Custom, the operations manager first verifies the 
criterion that the case unit gets a throughput of at least 50% of Its labor costs. If the criterion 
is met, then the manager incentivizes the head worker on a predetermi ned rate that varies wi th 
the type of prod ucts made. Note that the other workers are either new or casua! employees 
.who only hold the execution right. If the headworker makes a product similar to a previous 
order, the rate is lower than when the workers develop brand new prototypes. There is no 
d i reet link between the profitabll ity criterion and the incentive compensation. Note that the 
throughput value is not only influenced by the workers but also by the market forces. Further, 
the workers also consu!t with several other functions in completi ng thei r jobs. Hence, J ink ing 
the profitability criterion and incentive compensation is difficult. 
In Adept, a portion of the overall profits is distributed as incentive compensation 
(cal led as 'bonus', n Adept) to all employees either equally or in proportion to salaries. Though 
there are separate functional departments such as design and production, the departments 
interact mutually. Thus, it is difficult to set bonus schemes separately for each department. 
The managersadmitthatthe CEO introduced two schemes in the past, butwithdrew both of 
them due to operational difficulties. At present/ the CEO offers bonus on a random basis, 
r.e., unknown amounts at irregular intervals on an equal or pay-related basis. The managers 
admit that they hold the discretion to reduce or cancel the bonus payment to any worker 
If subjective evaluations are not good. The above structu re fits into Adept's complex transactions. 
This is because the managers believe that If a regular amount were to be paid, the workers 
would consider the bonus as a part of their salary. In tum, the scheme would cease to offer 
motivational val ue to the workers. 
The incentive compensation schemes of the two customer-specified case units are apparently 
different. While Sko"pe Custom provides the compensation based on a predetermined rate, 
there is no such definite rate in Adept. Though the findings do not reflect the expectations. 
regarding the incentive portion of the hypothesis, the schemes are consistent with the TCE 
theory. Firstl the schemes are based on overall profits of the case units, which in tum are 
allocated to the workers based on their individual efforts. Second, the evidences indicate the 
difficulty in setting up individual-based schemes, when high knowledge specificity exists. 
Table 4 illustrates the incentive schemes of the two customer-specified case units. 
In summary, the decis.ion management rights in both case units are inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 2 in that the rights are shared by the managers with thei r workers. The performance 
eva I uation is based on job plan related measu res, and thus, it is consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
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T able 4~ Incenti\'e Compensation in the Case Units Adopting Customer-specified PVS 
! Skope Custom 
Assume the foHowing numbers. ThrDughput generated in a period is $280,000. Direct labor 1 
cost in the case unit is $240,000. Customized orders completed in the periexl are 180. New ~ 
or prototype designs are 120 and the b<l!ance are the orders with designs simi lar to those ~ 
, carried out in the prevlous month. The compensation for prototypes is $50 for every design 
, 
and for repetition $10 for every design. 
Basis of Computation Amount ! 
Stage 1 Check if throughput divided by labor cost $280,000/$240,000 
exceeds 50%. If so, proceed to stage 2 i > 115% 
Stage 2 (Number of prototypes ~ $50) + (number of 
I 
n20~50} + (60*10) 
repeat designs' * 10) 
"" 
$6600 
, 
Adept Molding 
The case unit's overall periormance is greater than expected by the CEO. For ~ nstance, the case 
! 
unlt generates record sales of $1 rtm per month consistently over the past three months. The 
CEO then -eval uates the employee morale and future pot~ntial results and determines the 
amount of incentive compensation payable to every employee rmanager or worker}. 
Basis of Computation Amount 
~ 
Stage 1 Case unit's overall performancE! must 
exceed CEO's expectations. The CEO believes 
that the i ncentivizing such performance can -
increase the value of the finn. The performance 
I events are identified randomly. 
Stage 2 If so, all managers and workers are entitled to fi xed .amounts ($600) 
the incentive compensation as determi ned by 
! 
or proportionate (2%) 
the CEO. The amount is random and the timing to gross salaries 
! is at uncertain intervals. 
! 
The incentive compensation in both case units is not consistent with the hypothesis, where: 
.. In Skope Custom, the incentive compensation is traced on Iy to the head worker and 
not to the team; and 
• In Adept l the compensation is traced to the whole firm as one team rather than 
to individual teams with the firm. 
The analysi5 reveals that the three MCS elements are interrelated. Note that reciprocally 
shared decision management rights can best be evaluated through job-plan measures such as 
overall profitability and schedu led completi on. As these measures can lead to opportunism by 
i ndividua!s, firms combine subjective measures and link the allocation of incentive compensation 
to such subjective measures, 
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Analytic Generalization and Conclusion 
The author general izes the findings from the case units to the TeE model. This process refers 
to using a specific context of firm- and customer-specified PVS to generalize to the 
underlying theoretical construct of Jow and high knowledge specificity, respectively. 
Yin (1994, p. 36) cautions that the "'generalization is not automatic". The extent to which 
the author can generalize is limited by how far the chosen context is representative of the 
underlying theoretical construct and how far the article replicates the findings j n a sl2:cond case 
study just the same way a second ex peri ment replicates the fi rsL Though the construct val idity 
is high and replication is in the expected direction {similar for literal and opposite-fortheoretica! 
replication), the specific findings are different from the hypothesized model. In Ii!'le with the 
specific findings, the generalized TeE rnod~1 is as follows. 
Manager-worker transactions are examinable in terms of low and high knowledge specificity. 
As low specificity implies that genera! knowledge exists ex ante for aU transactions, managers 
do not need to delegate a" the decision managem~nt rights except the execution right to 
workers. Decision management rights flow sequentially from managers to workers. Workers 
need experience only in execution and not in planning. Managers evafuate each individual 
worker's execution perfonnance by setting task standards for throughput and tracing incentiv~­
to individual workers to motivate better performance. However, the task stand<lrds and incentives 
for safety and quality are traced to teams to encourage workers to help each other in distress_ 
The incentives are paid on!y if the firm achieves its budgeted profits. 
High specificity implies that specific know}edge lies disper.sed in bits across different 
individuals. To implement such transactions, managers share all the decision management 
rights with workers as a team to pool the knowledge bits and create a knowledge base 
(job plan) ex post that is relevant onlY for the cur;ent transaction. Decision m.anagement rights 
are reciprocal with in teams. Workers' experience in plann i ng tasks is essential (and not mereiy 
desirable). Managers evaluate the teams' actual performance against job plans. Teamwork 
offers- scope for some members to free ride_ To motivate individual contribution to.rl te'3!h, 
managers fi rst trace incentives to the teams and then al locates to workers based on ~ubjective 
evaluation of individual contribution. To ensure equity in subjective evaluation, the CEO 
di rects managers to adopt coworkers~ peer assessment (along with managers' own assessment), 
and further, incentivize the managers under a different scheme, However, when teams continually 
need to i nterad wlth other teams, the CEO determines the incentive compensation more on a 
firm-wide basis. 
This study first develops a general TeE model of MC5, which is applied in four specific 
case units that pursue PVS. Deriving support from construct validity and replication results, 
the specific PYS findings are generalized to the wider theoretical construct of knowledge 
specificity. The generalization is that when knowledge is less specific to the transaction in 
hand, mamgers. plan the tasks and direct workers to adhere to the plans. The workers' throughput 
performance is eva luated on an individual basis_ As knowledge becomes more specific to the 
transaction in hand, managers and workers plan the tasks reciprocally in teams_ Within f~rms, 
teamwork becomes critic.;)i wIth increasing knowledge specificity. The mode! can £lpply to 
other business strategies such as qu~ality, lead time and brand equity. 
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The variations in the case units' sizes and affi1;ations offer other theoretical contexts to 
wh i{:h the model can be applied. Skope Custom, a small customer-specified division of Skope 
Industries follows an MCS design that is distinct from the rest of the firm. Adept, the other 
customer-specified case unit, is an independent firm that is larger than Skope Custom. Consistent 
with the theory, Adept a Iso adopts an MCS design that is largely 5; mi lar to Skope Custom. The 
observations suggest that a large case unit has. more departments or hierarchical positions to 
perform tasks done within fewer departments or positions in a small case unit. The results 
suggest that the mode! is still generalizable to different sizes and a.ffiliations .• 
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